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FOREWORD

Counterinsurgency is seemingly not of great concern to the
U.S. Army today. This may represent a period of remission rather
than the apparent abandonment of the mission. It is possible
that the U.S. military may again become engaged in
counterinsurgency support in the future.
In this study, Steven Metz argues that the way the
Department of Defense and U.S. military spend the time when
counterinsurgency support is not an important part of American
national security strategy determines how quickly and easily they
react when policymakers commit the nation to such activity. If
analysis and debate continues, at least at a low level, the
military is better prepared for the reconstitution of
capabilities. If it ignores global developments in insurgency
and counterinsurgency, the reconstitution of capabilities would
be more difficult.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this
study as part of its ongoing analysis of the strategic dimensions
of military operations other than war.

WILLIAM W. ALLEN
Colonel, U.S. Army
Acting Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY

Today, there is no pressing strategic rationale for U.S.
engagement in counterinsurgency but history suggests that if the
United States remains involved in the Global South, one may
emerge. American counterinsurgency strategy has unfolded in a
distinct pattern over the past 50 years. At times, policymakers
saw a strategic rationale for engagement in counterinsurgency.
When they did, the military and Department of Defense formed or
reconstituted counterinsurgency doctrine, concepts, and
organizations. When the strategic rationale faded, these
capabilities atrophied. This pattern may be repeated in the
future.
During the last decade of the Cold War, the U.S. military
developed an effective approach to insurgency and implemented it
in El Salvador, but this focused on one particular type of
insurgency: Maoist "people's war." The El Salvador model may not
apply to post-Cold War forms of insurgency. Moreover, many of
the basic assumptions of American counterinsurgency strategy
appear obsolete. Trends such as ungovernability, the
routinization of violence, and the mutation of insurgency change
the costs/benefits calculus that undergirded Cold War-era
strategy and doctrine.
During the current period of remission in insurgency, the
Army should use its intellectual resources to analyze ongoing
mutations in insurgency and to open a debate on the nature of a
cogent post-Cold War counterinsurgency strategy. This strategy
should expand its conceptual framework and stress three
principles: selectivity, multilateralism, and concentration on
secondary support functions including indirect or second-tier
engagement. Such efforts will pave the way for the
reconstitution of American counterinsurgency should it be
required.

Y

COUNTERINSURGENCY
Introduction.
The insurgents of the world are sleeping. Few new old-style
insurgencies have emerged since the end of the Cold War and many
old ones, from the Philippines to Peru, from Mozambique to El
Salvador, from Northern Ireland to the West Bank and Gaza are
lurching or inching toward settlement. But sleep is not death-it is a time for rejuvenation. Since the means and the motives
for protracted political violence persist, it will prove as
attractive to the discontented of the world in the post-Cold War
global security environment as it did before. Eventually
insurgency will awaken. When it does, the United States will be
required to respond.
Since the late 1940s, the importance American policymakers
attached to supporting friendly states facing guerrilla threats
has ebbed and flowed. Often counterinsurgency was not considered
strategically significant and the defense community paid it
little attention. When the president did decide that insurgency
posed a threat, the military and the defense community had to
craft or update an appropriate conceptual framework, organization
and doctrine. Like a phoenix, American counterinsurgency
capability periodically died, only to be reborn from the ashes.
And always, how the period of remission was spent shaped the
process of rebirth. When the military and defense community
maintained a cadre of counterinsurgency experts to ponder past
efforts and analyze the changing nature of insurgency, the
reconstitution of understanding and capability was relatively
easy.
Today there is no pressing strategic rationale for U.S.
engagement in counterinsurgency but history suggests one may
emerge if the United States remains involved in the Global South.
This is the time, then, for introspection, assessment, and
reflection--for keeping the intellectual flame burning, even if
at a very low level. Just as conventional combat units train
after an operation in order to prepare for future ones (while
hoping they never occur), the U.S. military and other elements of
the defense community must mentally train for future
counterinsurgency. This entails both looking backward at
previous attempts to reconstitute counterinsurgency capabilities



and looking forward to speculate on future forms of insurgency
and the strategic environment in which counterinsurgency might
occur. To do this now will shorten the period of learning and
adaptation should counterinsurgency support again become an
important part of American national security strategy.
Threat and Response, Mark I.
From the end of World War II, revolutionary insurgency was
epidemic in the developing world, driven by an unfortunate
conflux of trends and factors. For instance, most Third World
governments exercised only limited or ineffective control over
parts of their nations. Because of rugged terrain, poor
infrastructure, government inefficiency, and tradition, the
common pattern was for the influence of the regime to decline
according to distance from the capital. The national government
was something of an abstraction. As Jeffrey Race noted in his
classic study War Comes to Long An, "for the majority of the
Vietnamese population, 'government' has always meant simply the
village council--the peasant had little experience of any
1
other." The fragile legitimacy of many Third World regimes also
helped set the stage for insurgency. Since many Third World
states were artificial creations of colonialism, no national
government, however good, would be accepted by all segments of
the population. The stress on local or primal identities during
the colonial period--part of a deliberate "divide and conquer"
approach by the imperial metropoles--exacerbated this problem.
In Asian and African states where decolonization was peaceful,
regimes often found it difficult to build legitimacy because of
the taint of association with the colonial masters. Even in
regions long independent or autonomous such as Latin America and
parts of the Islamic world, repression and corruption by
autocratic or traditional regimes eroded governmental legitimacy.
The electronic and transportation revolutions of the 20th
century also paved the way for revolutionary insurgency by
allowing people in remote regions to develop an accurate sense of
their predicament. Before modern communication, the hinterland
poor assumed that all the world lived as they did. With the
advent of modern communication, they recognized their
disadvantages and, more importantly, came to blame the
government. The result was what social scientists call the
"revolution of rising expectations" which simply meant that



demands on Third World states tended to grow faster than the
government's ability to meet them, thus generating frustration.
Empirical studies have closely linked the resulting "perceived
2
relative deprivation" with political violence . Improvements in
communication and transportation also gave revolutionaries
methods to organize support and allowed them to study and emulate
revolutionary success in other parts of the world.
At the same time, changes in global values helped legitimize
revolutionary violence. Although Americans often forgot it
during the Cold War, armed resistance to repression has been an
intrinsic part of the Western political tradition, enshrined in
the Declaration of Independence. Reflecting this, the political
left in the United States and Western Europe remained sympathetic
to Third World revolutionaries fighting repressive regimes.
Ironically, the ascendence to superpower status of the United
States, with its strong liberal tradition, helped spark global
consciousness concerning human rights which, in turn, further
legitimized armed resistance to repression. It is not
coincidence that Ho Chi Minh cited the American Declaration of
Independence during his announcement of the independent Republic
3
of Vietnam in 1945 . The French-speaking parts of the Third
World also found justification for revolution in their
intellectual heritage. The liberating effect of political
violence was a recurring theme among French thinkers Rousseau
4
through Georges Sorel.
Frantz Fanon, who argued that only
violence could psychologically liberate the victims of
5
colonialism, was very influential among Third World radicals.
And throughout the 1950s and 1960s the United Nations General
Assembly, increasingly dominated by Third World nations recently
liberated from colonialism, implicitly and, sometimes, explicitly
approved armed struggles which it considered "just."
Finally, the existence of an international support network
manipulated by the Soviet Union encouraged the spread and
persistence of insurgency. Armed opponents otherwise easy for
even weak regimes to defeat became serious threats with training,
advice, equipment, and sanctuary from the Soviet Union, China, or
one of their surrogates. Mao's triumph in 1949, in addition to
providing a blueprint for successful revolution, offered
potential insurgents proof that even apparently strong, Westernbacked regimes could be defeated.



Insurgency took a number of forms, some specific to certain
regions or countries, others global, but all were attempts to
alter the social, political, and economic status quo through
violence. In contrast to insurrections or coups d'état,
insurgencies were characterized by protractedness and broad
participation. In essence, insurgent strategists had two tasks:
first, strip legitimacy from the regime, and, second, seize it
themselves. The precise strategy of an insurgency varied
according to its leaders' backgrounds, personalities, and answers
to questions concerning the nature and extent of the insurgent
coalition, its ideological framework, geographic focus, and the
priority accorded the military and political dimensions of the
conflict.
Of the insurgent strategies that appeared during the Cold
War, Maoist "people's war" was undoubtedly the most successful.
With the exception of Cuba, nearly all victorious insurgents-Vietnam, Cambodia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Guinea Bisseau,
Namibia, Algeria--followed some variant of Maoist "people's war."
This had several defining characteristics: the primacy of
political organization over military operation, the development
of extensive political undergrounds and common fronts of
"progressive" organizations and movements, protractedness, and
emphasis on rural areas. All of these are simple ideas. Why,
exactly, was "people's war" so successful? In part, because it
correctly identified and targeted the key vulnerabilities of most
Third World regimes: limited legitimacy, weak public support, and
shaky control of the hinterlands. Maoist "people's war" was also
able to organize the very real, local grievances of Third World
peasants into a strategically significant movement. This
distinguished "people's war" from the innumerable serf, slave,
and peasant rebellions of the past, most of which never
transcended their local roots. Maoist "people's war" was
successful less because it was truly new or innovative than
because it was holistic, integrated, and synchronized while the
efforts of the counterinsurgents were sometimes astrategic or, at
best, torn by contradictory and counterproductive practices.
And, finally, Maoist "people's war" succeeded because it was new.
Still, many of the key counterinsurgent powers had dealt
with small wars before. The French and British fought insurgentstyle opponents during their colonial expansion in Asia and
Africa, and the United States had faced guerrillas during the
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Indian wars and in the Philippines, Mexico, and Nicaragua.
Yet
this did not immediately translate into proficiency at opposing
communist "people's war." After some initial problems, though,
the United States came to grips with the Huk Rebellion in the
Philippines and the British eventually defeated a Chinese7
inspired insurgency in Malaya.
The French developed the most
elaborate concept of counterinsurgency but had the least success
implementing it. Based on their experience in Indochina, the
French concluded that counterinsurgency must mirror "people's
war." It thus required a careful blend of military, political,
and psychological efforts including pro-government propaganda,
mobilization of the state's political resources, attacks on the
subversive infrastructure, reconquest of liberated zones,
isolation and destruction of insurgent military forces, and
8
diplomatic efforts.
Similarly, the British stressed strict
unity of effort between the military, economic, political, and
police forces during counterinsurgency, effective political and
psychological operations, and the limited use of firepower in
9
military operations.
Initially, neither of these concepts found
eager converts in the U.S. military. Rather than use the 1950s
to hone their understanding of insurgency, policymakers and
senior military leaders ignored the hard-earned wisdom of
America's allies and forgot what the United States itself had
learned and captured in documents like the Marines' astute Small
10
Wars Manual of 1940.
During President Dwight D. Eisenhower's tenure, American
national security strategy had been based on "massive
11
retaliation."
American superiority in strategic nuclear
weapons, he believed, would deter Soviet aggression better and
more cheaply than conventional forces. In the 1950s strategic
thinkers linked nuclear stalemate and "indirect aggression," but
12
thought this would come as limited conventional war.
As a
result, Americans trained their Third World allies to confront
Korea-style external invasion rather than internal threats. In
addition, U.S. conventional forces had declined precipitously
after the Korean War, leaving the United States with little to
counter guerrilla warfare. Even Army Special Forces, which were
created at this time, focused on partisan warfare and
unconventional operations in Europe rather than insurgency. To
the extent that Third World conflict was a problem, Eisenhower
and his national security team felt that the European colonial
powers--Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, and



Belgium--would deal with it.
Under Kennedy, this changed. Inspired by Khrushchev's
January 1961 speech endorsing "wars of national liberation," the
eroding security situation in Laos and South Vietnam, the
consolidation of Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba, the French defeat
in Algeria, and the outbreak of communist insurgencies in
Colombia and Venezuela, Kennedy was convinced that indirect
aggression through guerrilla insurgency had become a paramount
security threat. The strategic rationale for U.S. engagement in
counterinsurgency thus grew from ideas like the "domino theory"
and the notion of "death by a thousand small cuts" advanced by
French theorists of guerre révolutionnaire. Revolutionary war,
this group believed, was the dominant form of conflict in the
late 20th century. A defeat for pro-Western forces even in
places that appeared strategically insignificant became important
when seen as one more small contribution to global Soviet
victory. Metaphorically, at least, the Cold War consisted of
interminable skirmishes rather than decisive pitched battles.
The strategic significance of insurgency, in other words, was
symbolic and perceptual rather than tangible and empirical.
Kennedy immediately instigated a wide-ranging program to
13
He first formed a Cabinet-level
improve U.S. capabilities.
Special Group--the Interdepartmental Committee on Overseas
Internal Defense Policy--to lay the groundwork for a unified
counterinsurgency strategy and coordinate the disparate elements
14
of the government.
The Pentagon established the Office on
Counter-Insurgency and Special Activities headed by Major General
Victor H. Krulak (USMC) and gave him direct access to the Joint
15
Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.
The services
integrated counterinsurgency into their professional educational
systems, and established training centers. Army Special Forces
were expanded and reoriented toward counterinsurgency assistance.
Even the State Department and Agency for International
Development began to take counterinsurgency seriously (albeit
16
with less enthusiasm than the military).
Within a year, the Interdepartmental Committee released a
basic statement of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy. It stated:
The employment of indirect aggression through the use
of subversion and insurgency against Free World



institutions is related directly to the fact the world
is dominated by two over-whelmingly strong centers of
power. These power centers tend to become involved
directly or indirectly in most of the critical
situations that occur throughout the world. They tend
at the same time to muffle any violent confrontation so
as to avoid escalation to the nuclear level. On the
part of the communists, this has resulted in an
increased effort to seek their objectives by subversive
17
insurgency rather than overt aggression.
Reflecting the theoretical work of Kennedy advisor Walt
Rostow, the policy assumed economic "take off" was inherently
18
destabilizing and stressful.
Communists, under the leadership
of the Soviet Union, exploited this for their own geostrategic
ends. The solution was to ameliorate the root causes of the
insurgency, to "deal with and eliminate the causes of dissidence
19
"The U.S. must always keep in mind," wrote the
and violence."
Interdepartmental Committee, "that the ultimate and decisive
target is the people. Society itself is at war and the
resources, motives and targets of the struggle are found almost
20
wholly within the local population."
But the policy stressed
that outsiders cannot solve insurgency, and thus the role of the
United States should be strictly limited. The United States
sought to augment "indigenous capabilities" and seek "the
21
assistance of third countries and international organizations."
The new policy intentionally glossed over what would later
became a raging debate between those who focused on the
endogenous political and economic causes of the insurgency and
those who stressed outside intervention and the military
dimensions of the problem. The debate between "root causes" and
"military threat" approaches to counterinsurgency grew from the
deliberate decision of insurgent strategists to make their
struggle neither war nor peace. Western democracies knew how to
deal with war and knew how to deal with peace. They were
confused, however, by conflicts overlapping and blending the two,
by what American policymakers and strategists would later
recognize as deliberate ambiguity.
When the U.S. military became heavily involved in Vietnam,
senior leaders largely ignored the American experience with small
wars as well as that of the British and French. From first
involvement until the mid 1960s, American advisors sought to



augment the conventional military capabilities of the South
22
Vietnamese Army (ARVN) in anticipation of a Korea-style war.
Even when the true nature of the conflict became clearer, the
U.S. Army, in Andrew Krepinevich's words, "was neither trained
nor organized to fight effectively in an insurgency conflict
23
environment."
With the exception of the Marines and Army
Special Forces, the U.S. military was uninterested in the more
mundane aspects of counterinsurgency such as training the ARVN,
village pacification, local self-defense, or rooting out
24
insurgent political cadres, at least at the higher level.
Perhaps more importantly, the United States never forced the
South Vietnamese regime to undergo fundamental reform. Army
Chief of Staff General Earle G. Wheeler reflected the thinking of
Johnson and top advisors when said, "The essence of the problem
25
in Vietnam is military."
Still, inappropriate military techniques in themselves did
not lose Vietnam. With a clear, coherent counterinsurgency
strategy and a president who understood Marxist "people's war,"
the U.S. military could have been forced to change. But basic
U.S. counterinsurgency strategy contained major flaws. Having
never faced major engagement in a serious Maoist "people's war,"
American policymakers grossly underestimated the extent and
length of commitment that this entailed, and thus became involved
in an area with absolutely no U.S. interests beyond the symbolic.
The Kennedy policy gave inadequate attention to preparing the
American public for engagement in counterinsurgency. In part
this was because the Kennedy approach to counterinsurgency
eschewed major involvement by the armed forces and stressed
advice and assistance. It also grew from Kennedy's confidence in
his ability to mobilize public support when necessary. Whatever
the cause, the effects were debilitating.



Some writers have suggested that Kennedy recognized the
mounting problems of U.S. engagement in Southeast Asia and
26
But Johnson did
intended to withdraw after the 1964 elections.
not and, as popular approval of American involvement lagged, the
Vietnamese communists skillfully used a program they called dich
27
van ("action among the enemy") to further weaken public support.
The administration offered no effective response. Lyndon
Johnson thus inherited a flawed strategy and made it worse by
allowing advocates of a military solution--both those in uniform
and key civilians like National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow
and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara--to win bureaucratic
battles over the conduct of the conflict while simultaneously
refusing the military the resources it considered necessary for
28
victory.
By the time the United States formed an organization
to synchronize the military, political, and psychological
dimensions of the struggle in 1967--the Civilian Operations and
Revolutionary Development Support or CORDS program--it was too
29
The Viet Cong political infrastructure was too
late.
entrenched, the South Vietnamese regime too corrupt and
illegitimate, and the American public too alienated to win the
conflict. And even CORDS could not substitute for coherent
counterinsurgency strategy. As Phillip B. Davidson noted, the
30
communists won because they had a superior grand strategy.
Threat and Response, Mark II.



After Vietnam there was no presidential pressure to focus
the Pentagon's attention on counterinsurgency. Without a
strategic rationale, the Army relegated counterinsurgency to its
periphery, the flame barely kept burning by a handful of
31
concerned experts, most with Vietnam experience.
The 1981
version of basic Army doctrine for low-intensity conflict did not
32
Admittedly, there were
even use the word "counterinsurgency."
good reasons for this: conventional warfighting capabilities had
declined precipitously, and Europe and Southwest Asia posed more
pressing threats than Third World insurgency. The Carter policy
in the Third World placed greater emphasis on human rights than
containment. The leaders of ongoing insurgencies in places such
as Nicaragua and Zimbabwe appeared less solidly pro-Soviet than
their predecessors. Together, these considerations led President
Jimmy Carter to conclude that the cost and risks of American
engagement in counterinsurgency such as the strengthening of
corrupt, illegitimate, and repressive regimes outweighed the
risks of insurgent victory.
Luckily, when perceptions of the strategic situation began
to change, there was residual expertise within the military and
Department of Defense. The flame had been kept alive. The
motive for the reconstitution of counterinsurgency capability was
the growth of pro-Soviet regimes throughout the Third World,
especially the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua, gains by
communist insurgents in Guatemala, and the near-victory of the
Cuban-backed Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional (FMLN)
in El Salvador. "Death by a thousand small cuts" again found
articulate and influential spokesmen such as Secretary of State
Alexander Haig and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane
Kirkpatrick. In a critique of the Carter administration's
tolerance of leftist political movements in the Third World, Dr.
Kirkpatrick wrote, "violent insurgency headed by Marxist
revolutionaries is unlikely to lead to anything but totalitarian
33
tyranny."
In rhetoric reminiscent of Kennedy and his top
advisors, Secretary Haig argued that Americans should be
concerned "about illegal Soviet interventionism in El Salvador,
in Africa, in the Middle East, in Southeast Asia, and wherever
international law is violated and the rule of force is applied
against people who are seeking self-determination and social
34
change."
"We cannot," he stated, "ignore Soviet activity in the
developing nations because our passivity alters the calculations
of other countries. It makes further Soviet expansion or Soviet-



backed destabilization appear to be inevitable. It gives the
appearance--and it is no more than an appearance--that Marxism in
35
Such statements
the Soviet mode is the wave of the future."
offered an indication of the administration's intent and a
renewed strategic rationale for counterinsurgency.
As during the Kennedy administration, high-level attention
and the existence of a strategic rationale energized the
military. For instance, by the late 1970s counterinsurgency had
36
In
become a "non-subject" in the military educational system.
the 1980s, it was reintroduced with systematic attempts to
integrate the lessons of Vietnam. The Army's Special Warfare
Center, the School of the Americas, and the Air Force's Special
Operations School expanded their offerings on counterinsurgency.
Eventually the Navy added a program on low-intensity conflict at
its Postgraduate School sponsored by the United States Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM). The services created "proponency
offices" to coordinate thinking and education on low-intensity
37
conflict.
The Army and Air Force established a Center for LowIntensity Conflict (AAFCLIC) at Langley AFB. Army Special
Operations Forces and the foreign area officer program, both
major contributors to counterinsurgency support operations, grew.
The Senate Armed Services Committee, a particularly strong
advocate of organizational change, forced the Department of
Defense to name an Assistant Secretary of Defense for LowIntensity Conflict and Special Operations (ASDSOLIC) and create
USSOCOM. Recognizing the need for coherent strategy and policy,
the Senate panel urged the National Security Council to form a
38
low-intensity conflict board.
The Central Intelligence Agency
also augmented its covert action capability which includes
39
support to counterinsurgency.
The explosion of thinking and debate about low-intensity
conflict was even more important than institutional reform. A
number of serving and former government officials, retired
officers, and analysts at government-related think-tanks began to
40
write on low-intensity conflict.
Articles on counterinsurgency
returned in force to military publications such as Military
Review, Parameters, and Marine Corps Gazette after a decade-long
hiatus. The Department of Defense and the military services
41
42
sponsored major studies and workshops.
Congress held hearings.
As a result, a working consensus on appropriate post-Vietnam
43
counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine eventually emerged.



Conceptually, the Reagan policy echoed Kennedy's by
stressing the relationship of Third World conflict to the
superpower struggle. Secretary of State George Shultz could have
been reading from Kennedy administration policy statements when
he noted that low-intensity conflict "proliferated, in part,
because of our success in deterring nuclear and conventional
war...Low-intensity warfare is [our enemies'] answer to our
conventional and nuclear strength--a flanking maneuver in
44
military terms."
As in the Kennedy administration, Reagan
advisors were divided between hard-liners that stressed the wider
geostrategic dimension of low-intensity conflict and the role of
outside agitators, especially the Soviet Union and Cuba, and
moderates who focused on internal causes of insurgency. The
compromise which ensued was exactly the same as during the 1960s.
Reagan's 1987 National Security Strategy, for instance, noted
that the major causes of low-intensity conflict were "instability
and lack of political and economic development in the Third
World" which provided "fertile ground..for groups and nations
45
wishing to exploit unrest for their own purposes."
The Reagan counterinsurgency strategy blended "carrots" and
"sticks," simultaneously promoting democracy, development,
46
dialogue, and defense.
However, it was less globally ambitious
than the Kennedy policy, with a clear focus on Central America
and the Caribbean and, like its pre-Vietnam predecessor,
attempted to resist escalation. The 1987 National Security
Strategy, for instance, stated that indirect applications of
American military power, particularly security assistance, were
47
appropriate for low-intensity conflict.
The limits on American
involvement in counterinsurgency made even more explicit when the
1988 National Security Strategy emphasized that U.S. engagement
in low-intensity conflict "must be realistic, often discreet, and
founded on a clear relationship between the conflict's outcome
48
and important U.S. national security interests."
For the Army and Air Force, the counterinsurgency experience
of the Reagan administration was eventually codified with the
1990 release of FM 100-20/AFM 3-20, Military Operations in LowIntensity Conflict. Success in low-intensity conflict, according
to this doctrine, is based on five "imperatives": political
dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy, and
49
perseverance.
The pivotal concept is legitimacy defined in a



quintessential Western, rationalistic style. This assumes the
people of a country facing insurgency will decide whether the
government or the rebels can give them the "best deal" in terms
of goods and services, and then support that side. Following
this, U.S. activity in counterinsurgency is based on the internal
defense and development (IDAD) strategy under which the host
government "identifies the genuine grievances of its people and
50
takes political, economic, and social actions to redress them."
But while FM 100-20, like the national security strategy, noted
that the U.S. military role in counterinsurgency would "normally
center on security assistance program administration," it did not
rule out direct tactical involvement of U.S. forces even though
admitting this "will be rare." Similarly, tactical-level
doctrine stated,
The introduction of US combat forces into an insurgency
to conduct counterguerrilla operations is something
that is done when all other US and host country
responses have been inadequate. US combat forces are
never the first units into a country. They are
51
normally the last.
The gate to escalation, then, was narrower than in 1965, but not
closed entirely.
Just as Southeast Asia offered a laboratory for Kennedy's
version of counterinsurgency, Central America, especially El
Salvador, provided a testbed for the development of post-Vietnam
counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine. If there was ever a
nation "ripe for revolution," it was El Salvador in the late
1970s. Like much of Central America, El Salvador had a weak
economy dependent on commodity exports, badly maldistributed land
and wealth, a history of authoritarian government and military
intervention in politics, widespread corruption, and violent
suppression of political opposition. The nation had occasionally
attempted to develop an open political system, but without
success. Democracy, according to Salvadoran political leader
Guillermo M. Ungo, was "a cruel and painful deceit to
52
Salvadorans."
Furthermore, El Salvador's extreme population
density made things even worse than in neighboring states like
Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. All of the pathologies of
Central America were thus distilled in one small country.



Aided by substantial shipments of American military
equipment left in Vietnam a decade earlier and shipped to El
Salvador by way of Nicaragua, the FMLN guerrillas quickly became
"one of the most combat-effective insurgent organizations in
53
Central America, if not all Latin America."
By late 1980 they
controlled large areas of three northern provinces, and in
January 1981 launched a "final offensive" designed to topple the
Salvadoran government in the same fashion that Somoza had been
overthrown 3 years earlier. To support the attacks, the rebels
had stockpiled 600 tons of weapons, most from Soviet-bloc
54
sources.
With large-scale assistance from the Carter
administration--earlier cut off for the rape and murder of four
U.S. churchwomen by members of the National Guard-- the
government thwarted the "final offensive" but could not defeat
the rebels or even gain the tactical initiative. Until early
1984, the FMLN operated in large, conventional-style units and
continued to exercise partial control over regions of El
55
Salvador.
Despite the inauspicious combination of a brutally
repressive government, incompetent and corrupt military, and an
insurgent movement growing in political and military skill, the
Reagan administration decided to "draw the line." El Salvador was
to be the indicator of the new administration's more active
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containment of Third World communism.
A State Department
special report called the insurgency in El Salvador "a textbook
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case of indirect armed aggression by Communist powers."
Secretary of State Haig said, "our problem with El Salvador is
external intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign
nation in this hemisphere--nothing more, nothing less . . . the
rebel activity, its command, control, and direction, now is
essentially in the hands of external forces--Cuban, Nicaraguan,
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and, of course, indirectly, Soviet."
Focusing on Latin America was not a new twist in American
strategy. President Kennedy's efforts were directed more at
Latin America than Southeast Asia, and included the Alliance for
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Progress and the inter-American military system.
This policy
fell into disrepair when many Latin American insurgencies petered
out by the early 1970s. President Carter further cut security
assistance and training programs in the belief that Latin armies
were tools of repression. For President Reagan, the communist
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threat to Latin America changed the strategic calculus.
When



the administration decided to "draw the line" in El Salvador,
some elements in the U.S. military welcomed the chance to try
counterinsurgency again, this time tempered by the "lessons" of
Vietnam. According to an important report prepared by four Army
lieutenant colonels, "For the United States . . . El Salvador
represents an experiment, an attempt to reverse the record of
American failure in waging small wars, an effort to defeat an
insurgency by providing training and material support without
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committing American troops to combat."
A healthy degree of
realism and sense of constraint flavored the new approach to
counterinsurgency. But U.S. strategy and doctrine still
reflected the basic assumption that paved the way for escalation
in Vietnam: Americans knew how to defeat Maoist "people's war,"
but Third World regimes did not. Henry Kissinger's Bipartisan
Commission on Central America, for instance, distinguished
American-style "enlightened counter-insurgency" which stressed
the building of democracy and the encouragement of economic and
social development from the iron-fist approach favored by Third
62
The essence of counterinsurgency support was
World governments.
thus bringing "enlightenment" to American allies.
American military advisors were determined that El Salvador
would not become "another Vietnam." Armed with "lessons" from
Southeast Asia, Americans urged the El Salvador Armed Forces
(ESAF) to stress pacification, civil defense, and population
security--what was called the "other war" in Vietnam--rather than
the destruction of guerrilla units. The military, American
experts believed, should operate in small units with strict
constraints on the use of firepower. Since the support of the
population was the crux of counterinsurgency, military activities
should be subordinate to economic, political, and psychological
ones designed to augment the legitimacy of the government.
Equally important, the post-Vietnam counterinsurgency strategy
and doctrine stressed that the United States must not assume
control of the conflict.
The U.S.' post-Vietnam approach to counterinsurgency still
required making fundamental changes in the host nation's basic
social, economic, political, and military structures and beliefs,
but doing so with a limited American presence. The absolute crux
of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy, then, was finding ways to
encourage or force an allied government and elite to do things
they vehemently opposed. Improving the capability of the ESAF



was not enough. Salvadoran society had to be reformed, a just
legal system developed, right-wing political violence stopped,
the military submitted to civilian control, and the peasants
given a better life. U.S. policy then, sought to simultaneously
strengthen the military and promote democracy. The primary tools
were advice and assistance. The aid was only a small portion of
U.S. foreign assistance, but staggering considering El Salvador's
size. Military aid peaked at $196.6 million in 1984, economic
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assistance at $462.9 million in 1987.
Michael J. Hennelly has
calculated that from 1981 to 1992, American assistance to El
Salvador was about $1 million per day--this for a country of 5.2
64
million people.
American officials, both civilian and military, were
constantly frustrated at the difficulty they faced convincing the
Salvadorans to take the steps called for in the American approach
to counterinsurgency. It took a 1983 National Campaign Plan-written with substantial assistance from American General Fred F.
Woerner--to focus the counterinsurgency effort on winning popular
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support rather than killing guerrillas.
To that point, the
Salvadoran military had largely used "iron fist" techniques which
indiscriminately eradicated suspected insurgent supporters. The
result was gruesome massacres such as the 1981 destruction of the
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In fact, human rights abuses by the
village of El Mozote.
military and "death squads" of off-duty military and police posed
the greatest obstacle to the winning of popular approval by the
67
government.
It also threatened American support on a number of
occasions and was the primary tool used by the FMLN in building
an extensive international patronage network outside the Soviet
68
bloc.
Serious improvement in the human rights situation only
came after a direct warning in 1983 from Vice President Bush that
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continued death squad violence would lead to an aid cutoff.
Despite the persistence of human rights abuses and the
political skill of the FMLN, steady progress was made by the
counterinsurgents throughout the 1980s. By 1985, the ESAF was
competent enough that the FMLN reverted to small unit, protracted
warfare. Awash in American aid, the ESAF grew from 10,000
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soldiers at the beginning of the insurgency to 56,000 in 1987.
Elite special units were formed and proved particularly
effective. But the most important changes were political. With
intense American pressure, the 1984 presidential elections won by
José Napoleón Duarte were the cleanest in El Salvador's history.



By the end of the 1980s, El Salvador was a democracy--albeit a
fragile one, the ESAF a reasonably proficient military force, and
the FMLN stood little chance of outright victory. Still, most
analysts doubted that anything better than stalemate would ensue.
Today, however, El Salvador is at least a qualified success.
January 1992 peace accords reintegrated the FMLN into El
Salvador's political life, and a number of former rebel political
and military leaders hold elected office or head political
parties. Joaquín Villalobos, one of the preeminent FMLN
comandantes, has rejected socialism and now leads a reformist,
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left-of-center political movement.
El Salvador is rapidly
rebuilding war damage and the economy is fragile, but growing.
The third set of open presidential elections took place in 1994.
"In terms of US regional objectives," writes Victor Rosello, "El
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Salvador presently appears to be an unqualified success."
But
was it? If anything, the American experience in El Salvador
suggests that U.S. doctrine works against a particular type of
opponents, but only in conjunction with the appropriate strategic
framework. For future counterinsurgency strategy, El Salvador
had two important implications.
First, El Salvador showed the magnitude of the task when
applying the American concept of counterinsurgency. It can work,
but the political and economic costs are immense. El Salvador is
a small country close to the United States, but the United States
spent nearly $6 billion in assistance plus a tremendous amount of
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Put simply, the extent
political capital, time, and attention.
of change necessary to prepare a government for effective
counterinsurgency is immense. It requires not only changing
institutions and procedures, but attitudes and values. The final
costs of consolidating counterinsurgency--of making it permanent-are still not clear. The United States has lost interest in El
Salvador and is cutting assistance, but that nation's program of
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reconstruction and reconciliation is not finished.
Second, El Salvador showed the serious constraints on
American leverage. The major tool was "conditionality"--the
continuation of aid was made contingent on reforms, especially
the building of democracy and an end to death squad violence and
other human rights abuses. Phrased differently, U.S.
policymakers and diplomats had to convince the Salvadoran elite,
particularly the ESAF, that American aid was necessary for



success, but the aid would only continue if appropriate reforms
were made. The Reagan administration was able to pull this off
largely by a strategic version of the "good cop/bad cop" method
of influence. The administration expressed sympathy with the
predicament and difficulties of the elite and the ESAF
leadership, but reminded them that Congress--the "bad cop"--would
cut off aid without reform. Ironically, the end of the Cold War
increased American leverage because threats to cut off aid were
suddenly more credible. But, as Benjamin Schwarz points out, if
U.S. counterinsurgency strategy "proves most effective when vital
interests are not at stake, it will work best in situations that
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matter least."
Threat and Response, Mark III?
After Vietnam, specialists considered the essence of U.S.
counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine sound, but concluded that
it had not been applied properly in Southeast Asia. El Salvador
thus did not require a radical revision of either strategy or
doctrine, but simply better application. This was an accurate
assessment. Despite some stark differences, Vietnam and El
Salvador both occurred within the same strategic environment. In
terms of the broad nature of the threat and the wider
geostrategic concerns which shaped American decisionmaking,
Vietnam and El Salvador shared more features than not. Today,
U.S. counterinsurgency strategy continues to assume that the
wisdom gained in Southeast Asia and Central America holds. El
Salvador is thought to have proven the correctness of American
strategy and doctrine. "The El Salvador experience," Victor
Rosello writes, "generally validated the US Army's Foreign
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Internal Defense doctrine in countering insurgency."
Future counterinsurgency may not emulate the past--the
similarities between Vietnam and El Salvador will be much greater
than those between El Salvador and what comes after it. Since
the strategic environment determines the form and salience of
insurgency, the United States must now revise its
counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine. Some trends in the
post-Cold War strategic environment may inhibit insurgency,
others will simply force it to mutate. Many of them, though,
will alter the strategic calculus for the United States leading
policymakers to reconsider where, when, why, and how they engage
in counterinsurgency support.



In his seminal book, Political Order in Changing Societies,
Samuel Huntington argued that political development entails the
creation and maintenance of institutions capable of dealing with
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demands on the state.
The contemporary Global South is
undergoing mitosis, splitting into those able to craft adaptive
and viable institutions and those unable. Success at
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institution-building often leads toward democracy.
Since
functioning democracies are less susceptible to insurgency even
if not altogether exempt, this is good news. Failed institutionbuilding results, at best, in the division of states into
subnational units with security the purview of warlords and
militias. At worst, the outcome is anarchy and a Hobbesian war
of all against all. Robert Kaplan, among others, contends that
the trend toward anarchy will eventually win out and much of the
Global South will see "the withering away of central governments,
the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of
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Afghanistan,
disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war."
where "there is no civil law, no government, no economy--only
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guns and drugs and anger," may portend the Third World's future.
While political results are mixed, macroeconomic trends favor
fragmentation over sustainable democracy. Despite the economic
take-off of a few states, most of the Global South seems unable
to sustain a level of economic growth able to keep pace with
population. Democracy can be born in a stagnant economy, but
cannot grow to maturity.
A second related trend is the routinization of violence. At
best, this results in the omnipresence of crime. While crime is
growing in nearly all countries, this trend is most threatening
in developing countries where un- and underemployment are
epidemic and police forces overwhelmed, ineffective, or corrupt.
In much of the Global South, walls topped by concertina wire and
backed by elaborate alarm systems are standard on even middleclass homes. In poorer neighborhoods, dirt-floored, single-room
houses have thick bars on the windows. More and more businesses
have their own heavily armed guards. In Panama, for instance,
one sees frozen yogurt shops protected by men with M-16s. At its
worst, the global routinization of violence has spawned entire
generations for whom protracted conflict is normal. Whether
Lebanon, Gaza, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Liberia, or the
inner cities of the United States, youth see violence not as an
aberration, but part an intrinsic aspect of life. It takes



little to spark insurgency in such a context.
On the positive side, the end of the Cold War and the
evolution of global norms have diminished external sponsorship of
insurgency or its use as an element of national security policy.
For the present, at least, only pariah states dabble in the
export of insurgency and terrorism. The Cold War notion of the
moral legitimacy of support to armed struggle has thus abated.
The end of the Cold War also allowed a surge in the ability of
the United Nations to cobble together coalitions for peacekeeping
and broker negotiated solutions to conflict. For the United
States, the end of the Cold War did not end global engagement,
but changed national interests. American leaders have long had
little tolerance for military casualties in conflicts where they
saw few serious national interests or chances of clear success-witness Reagan's withdrawal from Beirut. With the demise of the
superpower competition, issues worth spilling American blood have
become even rarer even while the U.S. military remains engaged
around the world.
As the strategic environment changes, insurgency itself is
mutating. Distilled to its essence, a revolutionary strategy
includes goals and methods. The goals of Maoist "people's war"
were the seizure of political power and the revolutionary
transformation of the political and economic systems. Its
methods were political and guerrilla warfare followed, if
necessary, by conventional military action. Post-Cold War
insurgents may seek political, social, and economic
transformation that is revolutionary in its extent, but not
necessarily revolutionary in the Marxist sense of building a
"new" system. For instance, reactionary insurgency, in which a
religious-based group attempts to seize power from a secular,
modernizing government as the Iranians did in 1979, will be
common. In some ways this will also emulate Cold War
revolutionary insurgency in that legitimacy will be the focus,
control of the state the goal, and external support important,
but tactically future reactionary insurgents will largely be
urban with an emphasis on terrorism rather than rural guerrilla
war. This type of insurgency will be most dangerous if it again
becomes a technique of inter-state conflict with external
sponsors using insurgency to weaken an opponent.
Other post-Cold War insurgent movements will not seek to



seize the state in order to change the political, social, and
economic system. Many regions of the Global South will suffer
from what Larry Cable calls "defensive" insurgency where some
subgroup within a state, whether ethnic, tribal, racial, or
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religious, seeks autonomy or outright independence.
Given the
extent of primal conflict in post-Cold War world, such
secessionist/separatist insurgencies may be the dominant form
during the next decade. It is also the closest to traditional
"people's war" since the insurgents will place great stock on the
creation of "liberated zones." But where Maoists based
mobilization and support on political ideology, secessionist
insurgents will use primal ties. This will alter the essence of
counterinsurgency. When the opponent was Maoist, the government
could build legitimacy by offering the people a "better deal"
than the insurgents. When the roots of the conflict are primal
with the government controlled by a different group than the
insurgents, legitimacy will be extraordinarily difficult, perhaps
impossible, for the regime to win. As bitter struggles in Peru
and Guatemala have shown, the tendency will be for the government
to consider all members of the group supporting the insurgency as
enemies. And from a regional perspective,
secessionist/separatist insurgencies will be particularly
dangerous since they can easily spill over state borders.
What can be called commercial insurgency will also pose
security threats without seeking the outright seizure of state
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Commercial insurgency will be a form of what is becoming
power.
known as "gray area phenomena"--powerful criminal organizations
with a political veneer and the ability to threaten national
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security rather than just law and order.
In fact, many
commercial insurgencies will see an alliance of those for whom
political objectives are preeminent and the criminal dimension
simply a necessary evil, and those for whom the accumulation of
wealth through crime is the primary objective and politics simply
a rhetorical veneer to garner some support that they might not
otherwise gain. It is this political component that
distinguishes commercial insurgents from traditional organized
crime. Most often, though, commercial insurgencies will not
attempt to rule the state but seek a compliant regime that allows
them to pursue criminal activity unimpeded. If that is
impossible, they will use persistent violence to weaken and
distract the state. In many ways, commercial insurgency has the
longest historic lineage--quasi-political bandits and pirates,



from Robin Hood to Carlos Lehder, have posed pervasive security
threats throughout history.
Another emerging form of insurgency will be aimed at
multinational political organizations and military forces
attempting to stabilize failed states. These will emulate
anticolonial conflicts in Algeria, Angola, and the first phase of
Vietnam as the insurgents play on nationalism and, to an extent,
racial divisions. Since public support in the nations providing
the multinational force will often be precarious or weak, the
insurgents will need only to create instability and cause
casualties among the multinational force. Somalia is a prototype
for this new type of insurgency.
Within this array of goals, the methods used by insurgents
will vary according to the nature of the regime they oppose and
the extent of their support network. If the legitimacy of the
regime is weak, insurgents may follow something like Maoist
techniques. If the regime is a democracy with at least
moderately strong legitimacy, insurgents may pursue what U.S.
Army doctrine calls "subversive insurgency." This will combine a
legitimate, above-ground element participating in the political
process and an underground using political or criminal violence
to weaken or delegitimize the government and thus can also be
called camouflaged insurgency. The insurgents will camouflage
the connection between the above-ground and underground elements
in order to avoid alienating potential allies opposed to the
regime but not in favor of violence, and to complicate attempts
by the government to obtain outside assistance. It is much
easier for a regime to acquire international support to fight a
avowed revolutionary insurgency than a camouflaged insurgency
that gives all the appearance of general disorder or widespread
crime. When the underground element does destabilize the state
and the above-ground element seizes power, the immediate problem
for the new government will be reining in its violent wing. It
will first attempt cooptation. Failing that, the government will
have all of the intelligence needed to violently crush the
underground, thus cementing its legitimacy by bringing order and
stability. For the United States, subversive insurgencies may
pose intractable strategic problems because they will strike at
fragile democracies, and because their covert nature will make
early intervention difficult. Like many forms of insurgency,
camouflaged insurgency will be difficult to recognize until it is



so far developed that cures are painful.
In combination, changes in the strategic environment and
mutations in insurgency undercut the basic assumptions of U.S.
counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine. For example, during the
Cold War American policymakers often assumed the costs of not
acting when a friendly government faced a Marxist insurgency
outweighed the potential risks and costs of engagement. In the
post-Cold War strategic environment, this may not hold except
when insurgents intend to destabilize their neighbors. Marxism
was a proselytizing ideology. From Leon Trotsky to Daniel
Ortega, its adherents linked their own political survival to
spreading the revolution. Future insurgents may not
automatically come to the same conclusion, particularly if they
see that destabilizing neighbors and spreading the insurgency are
likely to provoke serious international involvement and make them
less secure rather than more so.
This holds important implications for the United States.
Victory by non-proselyting insurgents, even those ideologically
hostile to the United States, is unlikely to threaten serious
national interests. Existing policy and strategy suggests two
reasons for U.S. concern for insurgency. One is an updated
"domino theory." But if most post-Cold War insurgents do not
seek to spread violence, this argument weakens. It is also true
that it is easier to contain a radical state run by former
insurgents than to prevent insurgent victory. The other reason
for American concern is access to raw materials and markets.
But, as Benjamin S. Schwarz writes, "America's essential
interests very rarely depend upon which group controls resources
or power within underdeveloped countries...basic American
economic interests seem relatively secure whatever happens
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politically in the Third World."
This does not mean that the
United States has no economic interests in the Global South, but
simply that who holds power there will have only a minimal
impact. Since victorious insurgents must undertake post-conflict
national reconstruction, they are unlikely to stop exporting raw
materials. They may be more likely to close their markets, but
these are often insignificant anyway. And, even if victorious
insurgents did deny the United States access to a resource or
market, the costs would ultimately be less than the burden of
protracted counterinsurgency support.



In the post-Cold War security environment, the costs and
risks of counterinsurgency are increasingly altering the basic
strategic calculus. Counterinsurgency always risks damaging the
American credibility, either by association with a repressive or
corrupt regime, or by staking its prestige on the outcome of a
conflict and forcing policymakers to choose between the economic
costs of engagement or the political costs of disengagement. Put
simply, a government in serious danger of defeat by an insurgency
is often a bad ally. Hypothetically, the United States could
only engage in counterinsurgencies where the beleaguered
government is not so bad. But this is extraordinarily difficult,
mostly because of the way the United States usually becomes
involved in counterinsurgency. Rather than making a rational
costs-benefits assessment and then committing assistance until
the end of the conflict, Americans stumble in and persist as the
political costs of disengagement mount. During the Cold War, the
United States often rushed in to bail out governments facing
imminent defeat and then found that, rather than a bucolic summer
romance, it had entered a fatal attraction. In the post-Cold War
period, American involvement in counterinsurgency may grow out of
peace operations, but will still be inadvertent more often than
not. The Clinton administration's national security strategy
does not specifically mention counterinsurgency other than
"nation assistance" in Latin America, but its emphasis on global
engagement, expanding democracy, and supporting peace operations
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opens the way for stumbling into long-term commitments.
Decisions such as the willingness to provide arms to the
Cambodian government to fight Khmer Rouge guerrillas could be the
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first step.
American engagement in counterinsurgency also risks damaging
the social, political, and economic system of the friendly state.
For South Vietnam, the cure may not have been worse than the
disease, but it was close. In El Salvador the United States was
able to avoid damaging the state and society to the extent of
Vietnam, but a regime may eschew badly needed reform and
negotiation with insurgents if it thinks American assistance will
allow outright victory. It is possible that the Salvadoran
military recognized that the collapse of the Soviet Union spelled
the end of massive U.S. support, and thus finally allowed a
negotiated settlement that could have been reached several years
earlier. American involvement in counterinsurgency, then, is
often like lending money to a chronic gambler--it postpones real



resolution of the problem rather than speeding it.
Counterinsurgency can also damage American institutions and
morale. The erosion of national purpose and respect for
authority engendered by Vietnam has taken years to ameliorate and
will never be fully cured. Future American engagement in
counterinsurgency might also provoke domestic terrorism. With
easy global transportation, the existence of a variety of emigre
communities in the United States, and a perception of the
American public's unwillingness to accept casualties from
peripheral conflicts, insurgents may open an "American front" and
target public health, financial networks, communications systems,
and the ecology.
During the Cold War, American policymakers often assumed
that only the United States could provide effective
counterinsurgency support. This was always questionable. Often
the British and French better understood revolutionary insurgency
than Americans. In the post-Cold War security environment, the
most effective counterinsurgency support may come from military
institutions with extensive experience either fighting
insurgents--the South Africans, Nicaraguans, Turks, Israelis,
Peruvians, Filipinos, Colombians, and Salvadorans, for instance-or those such as the Zimbabweans with insurgent backgrounds.
Thus there may be others both willing and able to provide
counterinsurgency support in the post-Cold War security
environment. U.S. effort might be better spent augmenting the
planning, intelligence, sustainment, and mobility capabilities of
these regional counterinsurgency powers than directly aiding a
threatened regime.
Finally, Cold War-era counterinsurgency strategy and
doctrine assumed Americans understood insurgency better than the
threatened regime. Whether this was true or not, there is little
evidence that U.S. policymakers and strategists fully grasp the
motives, fears, and hopes driving emerging forms of insurgency.
Americans are particularly likely to fail against insurgents
driven by intangible motives like justice, dignity and the
attainment of personal meaning and identity. If, in Martin van
Creveld's words, "future war will be waged for the souls of men,"
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the United States will face profound problems.
As U.S.
experience with "holy terrorists" in the Middle East shows,
Americans are ill-equipped to deal with the "root causes" of



religion-driven violence.
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In the post-Cold War strategic environment, then,
counterinsurgency is increasingly becoming a high risk/low
benefit activity. The U.S. military and defense community must
make policymakers aware of this while simultaneously watching for
changes in the strategic calculus.

Conclusions and Recommendations.
American counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine must be
revised to reflect the post-Cold War strategic environment.
Because counterinsurgency is not a central element of current
U.S. national security strategy, such revision must deal with
broad concepts rather than specifics, thus paving the way for a
reconstitution of capability should the strategic calculus change
and a new rationale for counterinsurgency emerge.

Conceptual expansion should be the first step. The
definition of insurgency itself must be expanded to reflect the
complexity of the new security environment. The first post-Cold
War revision of FM 100-20--now called Operations Other Than War-recognizes the variegation of insurgency that accompanied the
collapse of the Soviet Union. While continuing to emphasize
Maoist "people's war," it pays greater attention to urban and
subversive insurgency than its predecessors. It also stresses
that U.S. neutrality in insurgencies "will be the norm." The new
doctrine argues that "Success in counterinsurgency goes to the
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party that achieves the greater popular support."
There are two
problems with this. First, it does not offer practical advice on
the spiritual and psychic dimensions of legitimacy. Americans
often assume that legitimacy arises solely from the provision of
tangible goods and services and thus overlooks the importance of
spiritual and psychic fulfillment. Second, the current American
approach to counterinsurgency as evinced in existing doctrine is
accurate for forms of insurgency that seek to seize power by
mobilizing greater support than the regime, but offers little
guidance for confronting gray area phenomena, "irrational"
enemies for whom violence is not a means to political ends, or
what Ralph Peters calls "the new warrior class"--"erratic
primitives of shifting allegiance, habituated to violence, with



90

no stake in civil order."
In a study that brilliantly captures
changes in the global security environment, Hans Magnus
Enzensberger writes,
Nothing remains of the guerrilla's heroic halo. Once
ideologically armed to the teeth and exploited by their
shadowy backers, today's guerrillas and anti-guerrillas
have become self-employed. What remains is the armed
mob. All the self-proclaiming armies of liberation,
people's movements and fronts degenerate into marauding
bands, indistinguishable from their opponents...What
gives today's civil wars a new and terrifying slant is
the fact that they are waged without stakes on either
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side, that they are wars about nothing at all.
For American counterinsurgents, this is a sea change. As
John Keegan points out, cultures with a Clausewitzean belief in
the connection of war and politics often have difficulty
comprehending--much less defeating--opponents with other
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motives.
The job of experts in the military and defense
community is to help overcome this. Some movement in this
direction has taken place. New joint doctrine, for instance,
states that foreign internal defense "has traditionally been
focused on defeating an organized movement attempting to
overthrow the government," but in the future "may address other
threats" such as civil disorder, narcotrafficking and terrorism
which "may, in fact, predominate in the future as traditional
power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic rivalries
surface, and the economic incentives of illegal drug trafficking
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To transcend the conceptual limits of the Cold War,
continue."
insurgency should be considered simply protracted, organized
violence which threatens security and requires a government
response, whether revolutionary or nonrevolutionary, political or
nonpolitical, and open or clandestine.

Building consensus on basic principles should be the second
step. In the post-Cold War security environment, four seem
appropriate. One is rigid selectivity. The key factor when the
United States considers engaging in counterinsurgency support is
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whether the threatened state and regime warrants the effort.
During the Cold War, the simple fact that a non-communist regime
faced a communist challenge led American policymakers to support
counterinsurgency. In the post-Cold War world, the United States



can and must be much more discerning. The international system
is not domestic society where every citizen, no matter how
reprehensible, deserves assistance.
The second principle of post-Cold War American
counterinsurgency strategy should be multilateralism. When
engaging in counterinsurgency, the United States should engineer
an international support coalition both to enlarge the assistance
available to the threatened state and to avoid staking U.S.
credibility on the outcome of the conflict. Even though American
counterinsurgency strategy has long called for multinational
efforts, policymakers seldom attempted to be "one among equals"
but instead formed hierarchical coalitions where the United
States clearly bore the brunt of the effort. Horizontal
coalitions should be the way of the future. In the Western
Hemisphere, the United States might lead such coalitions but
elsewhere rely on others.
The third principle should be concentration on secondary
support. The United States might lead efforts to deter, isolate,
and punish external sponsors of insurgency. In general the
United States should be an indirect or second-tier supporter
providing assistance to regional states with greater experience
in counterinsurgency and a more direct stake in a conflict. They
are more likely to truly understand the conflict and, since they
have a greater interest in regional stability, to persist if the
struggle becomes prolonged. One thing that made the Soviet Union
an effective supporter of insurgency was reliance on surrogates
like Cuba and North Vietnam. The United States should adopt this
practice. If the United States does join a multinational
counterinsurgency support coalition, it should focus on special
skills such as intelligence, mobility, planning support, and
psychological operation.
The fourth principle of post-Cold War American
counterinsurgency strategy should be organizational coherence.
The United States may need a new organization to confront new
forms of insurgency. With the exception of
secessionist/separatist insurgency, all post-Cold War forms will
be far removed from the Army's traditional areas of expertise and
will be more police functions than military ones. The Army
should thus encourage the formation of a permanent civil-military
cadre of experts with a strong emphasis on law enforcement and



intelligence collection and analysis. Rod Paschall's argument
that Western military forces are not proficient at
counterinsurgency and should be replaced by "an international
corporation composed of former Western officers and soldiers
skilled in acceptable counterinsurgency techniques" rings even
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truer today than when written in 1990.
What can the Army do to preserve residual counterinsurgency
capability? Working closely with the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, the
Army should use its intellectual resources to "keep the flame
burning," at least at a low level. Sponsored research, symposia,
workshops, conferences, discussion papers, working groups,
publications, and debate in the Army educational system can
contribute to this. The wargames, planning exercises, and case
studies used in the Army's professional educational system should
deal with commercial, subversive, or spiritual insurgency rather
than Maoist "people's war." The Army should also make sure it
retains a cadre of counterinsurgency experts within its ranks
during downsizing. With luck, no strategic rationale for
extensive U.S. involvement in counterinsurgency will emerge and
this cadre will never be activated. But it is the fate of the
military to prepare for the worst even as it hopes for the best.
With clear thinking now, the U.S. military can be ready to offer
effective advice should the strategic calculus change and the
United States once again see a rationale for major involvement in
counterinsurgency support.
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